Research Security Office
Foreign Travel Security Briefing
Foreign Travel Security Briefing
This briefing applies to all cleared and uncleared employees and consultants who are planning visits outside of the United States of America. If you have access to sensitive DoD information (either unclassified or classified) and/or Company Proprietary Information, you may be a potential target for foreign intelligence agents. When you travel outside of the United States, whether on business or on vacation, you will meet people from various foreign countries. It is under these conditions that the stage is often set for foreign intelligence gathering activities. Be aware with whom you communicate, as U.S. information is still targeted by foreign nations. This threat pertains to classified, sensitive protected, company proprietary, and other unclassified protected information. If possible, keep as many items visibly secured in bags, suitcases, or clothing.
As a traveler, you may be unfamiliar with the customs, people, language, topography, laws and the judicial system of that country. These factors will cause you to become more dependent upon strangers, thus increasing your vulnerability level…an attractive situation for the foreign agent. The same opportunities may exist in familiar countries.
Be alert to overly friendly or helpful strangers. Do not fall into a compromising situation where outside help may be needed or threats of blackmail could surface.
Your Security Officer can provide the latest State Department advisories on hazardous conditions, identify any known security concerns regarding the areas where you will be traveling or organizations with which you will be dealing, and provide general information on security risks during foreign travel.
As a U.S. government contractor, you are susceptible to foreign intelligence or security services anytime and anywhere. Although the Cold War has ended, many foreign governments still place a high priority on U.S. government information. As you travel overseas, the risk of being an intelligence target increases.
Any intelligence activity directed against you is usually in a non-threatening fashion; although, in some cases, a foreign intelligence service may employ more aggressive provocation tactics. Methods utilized may be either direct or indirect while most harassment incidents are intentionally obvious. Many intelligence activities are conducted without the target’s awareness.
Assessment: Friendly discussion with local contacts to assess whether the subject has information of value and to identify any personal attitudes, beliefs, problems or needs that could be exploitable. Elicitation: A ploy whereby seemingly normal conversation is contrived to extract intelligence information of value. Advantages of this technique are: (1) Puts someone at ease to share information, (2) Difficult to recognize as an intelligence technique, and (3) Easily deniable.
Eavesdropping: Listening to other people’s conversations to gather information. Frequently employed in social environments where attendees feel comfortable, secure and, therefore, more likely to talk about themselves or their work. Frequent venues include restaurants, bars, and public transportation. Eavesdropping can occur in a radius of six to eight seats on public transportation or ten to twelve feet in other settings.
Technical Eavesdropping: Use of audio and visual devices, usually concealed. This technique is relatively cost efficient and low risk. Concealed devices can be installed in public and private facilities, such as hotel rooms, restaurants, offices, and automobiles.
Bag Operations: Surreptitious entry into the subject’s hotel room to steal, photograph, or photocopy documents; steal or copy magnetic media; or download files from laptop computers. Often conducted or condoned by host government intelligence, security services, or operatives for local corporations. Frequently done with cooperation of hotel staff.
Surveillance: An act of following the subject to determine contacts and activities. This method is labor intensive, if done correctly, and not usually employed unless suspected of improper activity or a target of great interest.
Theft of Information: Stealing of documents, briefcases, laptop computers or sensitive equipment. Laptop computers are especially vulnerable as they may contain key information. Foreign service has plausible denial since the laptop may have been stolen for the value of the laptop rather than the value of information. This makes it difficult to determine if the information was compromised or not.
Intercepting Electronic Communications: Method of electronically monitoring telephones, facsimiles, and computers. Subject is particularly vulnerable while communicating to, from or within foreign countries, as most foreign telecommunications systems cooperate with their country’s security service. Office, hotel, and portable telephones (including cellular) are key targets.
Please fill out the place(s) of travel below with corresponding dates.
For more information on the Research Security Office, please contact Gregory Hughley ghughley@fiu.edu.